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Newport, RI

THE SEQUEL TO MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS
APPLYING CRITICAL FACTORS ANALYSIS TO OIF

By

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U.S. Department of State

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirement of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of State.

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18 May 2004

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ABSTRACT

The conflict in Iraq continues to plague the American administration. After “winning the war” with an astounding performance of major combat operations, America continues to have difficulty “winning the peace” and accomplishing one of the administration’s pre-war goals, “to help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government”.¹ Although the June 30, 2004 deadline to hand over authority to a provisional Iraqi government is fast approaching, it is debatable whether current security conditions will be conducive for a smooth transition. As the United States continues to improve its ability to achieve victory in major combat operations more quickly, our ability to “nation assist” those we defeat continue to elude us.

This paper will use the operational art concept of critical factors analysis to identify the objectives, critical strengths, critical weaknesses, critical vulnerabilities, and centers of gravity in this phase of post major conflict. Critical factors analysis is a powerful tool that can be used to analyze the sequel to major combat operations in order to develop courses of action (COA) for “winning the peace”.

Even though we are well into the Iraqi post conflict period, recommended actions will be developed for the entire period. The COAs resulting from this analysis will support the U.S. administration’s explicit stated goal to help the Iraqi people create the conditions for the transition to a government representing and serving all the people. More importantly, they will provide a vision, structure, and organization to enhance the capabilities in our future responsibilities conducting post conflict operations. Using critical factors analysis to develop actions with post conflict operations in Iraq as a model, demonstrates the value of this tool.

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¹ Jim Garamone, “Rumsfeld Lists Operation Iraqi Freedom Aims, Objectives”, American Forces Information Service News Articles, March 21, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/n03212003_200303219.html.

INTRODUCTION

On May 1, 2003 President George W. Bush announced that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. He made this dramatic announcement onboard the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72) off the coast of San Diego, California. Instead of declaring victory and ordering American troops home, he cautioned the American public and the world that long and difficult tasks remained. This involved the search for weapons of mass destruction, the pursuit and capture of Saddam Hussein, his two sons, and senior Iraqi leaders. Far more nebulous tasks included restoring order within and among three very diverse ethnic and religious groups, in addition to rebuilding an Iraq viable enough to hand authority over to a government acceptable to the Iraqi people.

American post conflict leadership got off to a shaky start. “In the weeks leading up to the invasion, the State Department began a series of meetings and seminars to plan for the aftermath of combat operations, highlighting likely postwar problems and feasible solutions. Donald Rumsfeld’s Pentagon, however, was not interested. ... Pentagon representatives who had been sitting in on the State Department sessions were pulled out and told not to participate any further”² Conflict between these two departments became more apparent as the sequel to post conflict operations began. As major combat operations were ending, retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner was named head of the DoD Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), becoming the initial public face to post major conflict efforts. His tenure was very short lived, a mere two weeks. On May 6, President Bush named L. Paul Bremer III as U.S. Presidential Envoy to Iraq. Replacing Garner, this made him the senior U.S. civilian official in Iraq as the Administrator of the

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). In another move, ORHA was absorbed into the CPA on June 1. Then in October, it was announced that “President Bush [was] giving his national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, the authority to manage postwar Iraq”³ Rice was named as the head of the Iraq Stabilization Group, a move to give Bush’s White House aides a stronger voice in decisions and make the president more directly accountable.

These announcements led to media commentary and speculation that there had been inadequate planning for the sequel to major combat operations. Who was responsible for this planning and subsequent execution? Was it the military, the State Department, the National Security Advisor, the President, or the international community? “... [T]he international community is no better coordinating for nation-building than the U.S. government, ... how to implement ... the transition to self-sustaining indigenous institutions.”⁴

Using the operational art concept of critical factors analysis provides a valuable tool for identifying those factors that can be used to develop courses of action (COA) to help answer these questions. By analyzing those factors in the post major conflict phase and comparing them to the missions, capabilities, and resources of different governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a structured analytical tool can develop effective courses of action to address the challenges. New courses of action may be discovered. Current courses of action may be either validated or refuted.

With the elimination of the Cold War threat, America has and will probably continue to be involved in more conflicts where it is easier to “win the war” but more difficult to “win the peace”. Whatever the outcome, this analysis is valuable to develop a rational plan based on critical analysis to provide a strategy to address this important national security issue.

² Walter Cronkite, “Iraq Teeters on Edge of Chaos Because of Poor Planning”, The Olympian, April 15, 2004.

³ Judy Keen, “Rice Will Manage Iraq’s New Phase”, USA Today, October 6, 2003.


⁴ Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-Building 101”, The Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004, 4.

OVERVIEW OF THE TOOL

Critical factors analysis is a tool taught in the Joint Military Operations (JMO) course and is part of the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) curriculum. It is used to develop the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES). In the development of the CES, both friendly and enemy critical factors are identified and analyzed to develop courses of action to achieve objectives. The analysis process provides a framework for the development of a selected course of action. This analytical process can be used to accomplish the strategic goals of post conflict operations.

Critical Factors: The Process

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Elements of Operational Warfare

* JMO OPS-II-8 Elements of Operational Warfare, Professor John Roberts, presented on March 25, 2004.

PROCESS & DEFINITIONS:⁵

The initial step of the process is to define the objective. The objective is the mission, aim, or purpose of the effort. Critical strengths are those military and nonmilitary capabilities considered essential to the accomplishment of the friendly and the enemy military objectives. Critical weaknesses are military and nonmilitary capabilities considered essential to the accomplishment of the friendly and the enemy military objectives, but are in terms of quantity and quality, insufficient to perform their intended function. Critical vulnerabilities are weaknesses, though sometimes strengths, that are either open to the enemy's attack or can be exploited by the enemy. Critical weaknesses are not necessarily critical vulnerabilities. Centers of gravity are those sources of massed strength. Serious degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or destruction of the center of gravity would have the most decisive impact on the ability of friend or foe to accomplish a given military objective. A center of gravity can be physical, moral, or a source of leverage. Once these critical factors have been identified and analyzed, courses of action can be developed to attack the enemy's center of gravity and protect those of friendly forces.

POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

There is a proliferation of names for post-conflict operations. Included are peace operations, peace building, nation-building, nation-assisting, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, military operations other than war (MOOTW), and complex contingency operations. These are but a few examples of names of operations that occur before, during, after, or instead of major combat operations. For the purposes of this paper, they are the

⁵ Definitions from Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare, (NWC 1004), Newport, RI, 2002.

military and nonmilitary “process of establishing civil order and governmental functions in countries that are emerging from a period of war or other types of upheaval.”⁶

IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY

The enemy during combat operations is not necessarily the same enemy in post major combat operations. During Iraqi major combat operations the enemy was Saddam Hussein and major Baath party leaders, in addition to the Iraqi military and security apparatus. This enemy, for the most part, has either been captured, killed, or has disbanded. The enemy now is more nebulous. It is any person, organization, or country that is working against the stated objective of coalition efforts to help the Iraqi people create the conditions for a transition to a representative self government. The objective of the enemy is to expel U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq. Examples include Shiite loyalists of Maqtada al-Sadr, remnants of the Saddam Fedeyeen, Islamic extremists, members of al-Qaeda, and possibly neighboring countries such as Syria, Iran, and Turkey. It is because of the complexity of identifying the enemy that objective based definitions must be used. Critical factors analysis includes identifying the objective at the beginning the analysis. This same technique can be used to identify the enemy when the adversaries are difficult to single out. For the purposes of this analysis, the enemy encompasses any insurgent, including religious extremists, terrorists, Saddam loyalists, and foreign interventionists, whose objective is to intimidate, destroy, or fight to prevent the Iraqi people from creating the conditions for the transition to a representative government.

⁶ Esther Pan, Nation-Building, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC, October 2, 2003, http://www.cfr.org/background/nation_building.php.

ANALYSIS

Security Stabilization: “Security is the sine qua non of post-conflict reconstruction ... if security needs are not met ... intervention intended to promote it are doomed to fail.”⁷ A secure and stable environment is the basic premise for any efforts to perform in a post major combat phase. Yet, “[i]t seems that the more swift and bloodless the military victory, the more difficult postconflict stabilization can be.”⁸ In Iraq, security is more than defeating the insurgents. How do you define security and the stability that comes with it? Instead of defining it, a way to describe this environment is by the statements that an average Iraqi citizen might be in a position to make in order for reconstruction to succeed, such as, “I can travel around my town without fear of attack” or “I have a means of income.”⁹ A critical strength to the establishment of a secure environment is the strong and visible U.S. and coalition troop presence in Iraq. These troops are involved in offensive actions against the enemy in an attempt to root out pockets of resistance. Another critical strength is popular will, reflected in the continuing strong U.S. domestic support for troops in Iraq. President Bush has committed to providing additional troops, if requested by the military, to support this effort. No deadline has been set for the withdrawal of U.S. and coalition troops.

However, there are also some critical weaknesses in the efforts to establish a secure environment. Insurgency and lawlessness are not yet under control. Loyalists of Sadr continue to fight coalition troops with deaths resulting on both sides. Sadr has “repeatedly called for foreign troops to leave Iraq, and his followers have held regular anti-US

⁷ Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the United States Army, Play to Win, January 2003, 4.

⁸ James Dobbins and others, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, RAND, Washington DC, 2003, xxii.

⁹ Jackson Diehl, “Winning the Post-Postwar”, The Washington Post, February 16, 2004.

protests.”¹⁰ Sadr loyalists continue to die in large numbers to support his call. Quelling this violence without inciting the Iraqi public is a critical vulnerability as we approach the June 30 deadline for handing over authority to a provisional Iraqi government. An escalation of conflict against coalition forces will provide a perception that conditions are not yet ripe for the turnover. Yet not meeting the publicly stated deadline of June 30 would be perceived as a setback for coalition progress. Another critical weakness is the extension of U.S. troop tours of duty past one year. “Military personnel experts have warned that full-time soldiers and members of the Guard and Reserve could begin leaving this year because of the strains of service, including longer and more frequent overseas missions.”¹¹ This has a detrimental effect on troop morale. The vulnerability is that it may translate to declining U.S. public support for keeping forces in Iraq. In a presidential election year, public support is critical to reelection efforts, especially for a president so closely identified with Operation Iraqi Freedom. The unfavorable press of coalition troop efforts is a critical weakness. This is especially true of the Arab press that focuses on any misstep. The publication of the Abu Ghraib prison pictures highlighted the vulnerability that an emboldened enemy will step up their efforts in revenge attacks. As a result, security in Iraq could deteriorate. Since a secure and stable environment is the foundation for all post combat efforts, deterioration would have a catastrophic effect on any future efforts to help the Iraqis.

Humanitarian Assistance: This is defined as the short term aid to the Iraqi population of food and water supplies, in addition to providing the basic services of electricity, water, sewage, and health care services. A critical strength is that there is no short term crisis in this area. At the end of major combat operations, priority efforts were made to

¹⁰ “Profile:Moqtada Sadr”, BBC News, 04 April, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/->

distribute food and restore basic utility services to pre-war conditions. Although comprehensive health care is still woefully inadequate, basic health care services have been restored and are supplemented by the coalition military. Another critical strength is the stockpile of supplies. As soon as the southern port of Umm Qasr, on Iraq's small Persian Gulf coast, was secured, humanitarian supplies were quickly offloaded, transported to key locations, and stockpiled to prevent critical shortages.¹²

Against this positive backdrop, Iraq has suffered from over a decade of decline in real income. More Iraqis are dependent on aid that were ten years ago. "Sixty percent of Iraqis currently depend on government handouts for their most basic needs."¹³ Without work opportunities, this aid may translate into dependency. That is a critical vulnerability that would stall coalition efforts to put Iraqis in the position to begin to grow their economy and move from an aid dependent society to one that is self sustaining. The health care system is another critical weakness that has suffered from years of neglect and decline. The system is barely functional with little or no supplies. Iraqis have not been vaccinated against many epidemic diseases. A critical vulnerability is an outbreak of an epidemic due to poor sanitation and lack of vaccines. This would overwhelm the already weak health care system and create a new crisis. Much of the humanitarian assistance and strengthening of basic services can be provided by international organizations and NGO's, their forte. However, these organizations are slow to engage in providing support to Iraq due to American unilateralism in conducting the war plus the lack of security in Iraq. The slow activation of

/2/hi/middle_east/3131330.stm.

¹¹ Dave Moniz,, "Fewer Soldiers Re-enlist", USA Today, April 16-18, 2004.

¹² John Bisney, "U.S., British Marines Securing Iraqi Port City", CNN.com, March 22, 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/22/sprj.iqr.southern.iraq>.

¹³ Fredrick Barton and Bathsheba Crocker, A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, January 2003, 5.

international and NGO support is a critical weakness to providing Iraq with the humanitarian assistance to maintain forward progress. Even with current international support, lawlessness and tribal rivalries prevent NGOs from transporting and delivering supplies throughout Iraq. Security is the cornerstone for all progressive efforts. Although U.S. and coalition efforts have been constructive to date, the next stage of progress will require the concerted efforts of international groups. Another critical vulnerability is the survival and credibility of the provisional Iraqi government if assistance and aid cannot continue to flow to the population. Without an ongoing stream of food, water, and basic services no government would be able to stay in power. Humanitarian assistance must expand providing the foundation for growth.

Political Transition: “Nation-building is not principally about economic reconstruction rather, it is about political transformation.”¹⁴ This includes the establishment of a civil administration, a provisional government, the holding of elections, and the acceptance by the Iraqi people of a representative government. There are major obstacles to achieving this objective: identifying credible leaders and resolving long standing tribal, ethnic, and religious rivalries. As bleak as this may appear, there are critical strengths in this area. “Iraq does have a well-educated population that could participate in reconstruction efforts.”¹⁵ Another critical strength is the backing of the current U.S. administration, a reflection of American popular will. The U.S. is staffing what will be a huge U.S missions in Iraq of 1,000 Americans. It will be led by a very experienced and powerful American ambassador, John Negroponte. U.S. troops will remain after the provisional Iraqi government has assumed control in July 2004. There is no stated deadline for their withdrawal.

¹⁴ James Dobbins and others.

But a number of critical weaknesses exist in this area. “Iraq has no tradition of pluralistic democracy”¹⁶ It has suffered from years of brutal dictatorship. Another critical weakness is Iraq’s non-homogeneous population. With Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the center and west, and Shi’ites in the south, there is a long history of deep rivalries among these groups. Many Iraqis identify more with their tribe than with their country. A critical vulnerability is the possibility that Iraq could digress into a civil war. This would not only be a major setback for the country, but could have catastrophic consequences for the entire region. Kurdish uprisings could occur in Turkey. Shi’ite factions in Iran could join Iraqi Shi’ites against Iraqi Sunnis. A power grab by different groups could expand from a national to a multinational tribal, ethnic, or religious war throughout the region. Another critical weakness is the time driven goal of installing an Iraqi provisional government on July 1. Instead of timing the inception of this government to when conditions are most favorable, this set date provides an opportunity for the enemy to exploit. Just as it can be argued that the terrorist acts in Spain were successful due to timing just prior to national elections, an attack timed around July 1 may doom the Iraqi government to failure before it even begins. A critical vulnerability would be an ineffective post-CPA provisional government. Over the longer term, this could play into an enemy critical strength, extreme ideology, and lead to the election of an extremist Islamic leader or the return of another brutal dictator.

Reconstruction Assistance: In contrast to humanitarian assistance, this is defined as longer term aid. It includes enhancing the oil sector, developing strong financial systems, relief of large foreign debt, in addition to strengthening public utilities, telecommunications systems, education institutions, health care centers, and the agriculture sector. A critical

¹⁵ Conrad Crane, Andrew W. Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq, Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military

strength is that major infrastructure survived the war pretty much intact. Due to the technology of precision guided weapons and the policy of not targeting the Iraqi physical infrastructure for destruction, these systems will not have to be constructed from scratch. Particular care was provided to ensure that the oil sector was protected, not only from coalition attack, but from the retreating Iraqi military. A second critical strength is that Iraq possesses significant oil reserves. Once the oil infrastructure is modernized, exports can provide much of the capital to fund reconstruction efforts. The U.S. administration is fully behind the reconstruction efforts. Congress has provided funds and contracts have been issued to begin these efforts.

Unfortunately, the entire Iraqi physical infrastructure has suffered from the UN sanctions after the 1991 Iraqi War. A critical weakness is that years of neglect due to lack of maintenance will require significant reconstruction efforts and external resources to modernize. A critical vulnerability is the protection of this infrastructure. Sabotage of the oil industry, electrical grids, or water systems would not only slow down reconstruction but would deteriorate the current dilapidated systems. Many of these systems are extremely vulnerable to sabotage because they are hard to protect. Oil pipelines crisscross the country and would require significant protective forces to guard against concerted terrorist attacks. Another critical weakness is the huge foreign debt accumulated under Saddam Hussein's regime. Diplomatic efforts have been underway to achieve at least partial relief. However, much of this debt is carried by France and Russia, two opponents of the U.S.-led OIF. The U.S. ability to negotiate favorable terms is weakened due to the lack of diplomatic leverage it has against these countries that still harbor an anti-American stance to the war effort.

Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, Carlisle, PA, February 2003, 40.

¹⁶ Conrad Crane, xxvi.

The ability to continue to fund a very costly and lengthy reconstruction effort is a key vulnerability. The U.S. will not be able to fund this alone and will require significant international support. Two factors inhibit this effort. One is the U.S. unilateralism in the war effort. The second is the upcoming U.S. presidential elections. If U.S. public support for the reconstruction effort declines and a different administration is elected with a new mandate, American funding could dry up. It has been shown that nation-building efforts are successful when supported for at least a half a decade. “To date, no effort at enforced democratization has taken hold in less than five years... There is no quick route to nation-building. Five years seems to be the minimum required to enforce an enduring transition to democracy.”¹⁷ Withdrawing this support to Iraq in less time will almost certainly doom it to failure. But convincing other international donors to fund what they perceive as an American war, if U.S. funding declines, would be hard to fathom.

ENEMY CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES

The enemy has a number of critical vulnerabilities in their fight against Americans and the coalition. The enemy must continue to engage friendly forces in combat to prove to the local population that friendly forces cannot maintain security. The inequitable firepower of the insurgents compared to those of coalition forces is an enemy critical vulnerability. As the recent battles between Sadr loyalists and coalition troops have shown, large numbers of loyalists are being killed with little or no casualties to coalition troops. However, loyalists will not continue this lopsided fight indefinitely. Another critical enemy vulnerability is the difficulty in disrupting humanitarian aid. To turn local support against Americans and the coalition, the enemy must disrupt the delivery of basic needs to the local population. Primary

¹⁷ Ibid, xxvi.

among these are food and potable water. However, stockpiles of these necessities were built up and located throughout the country soon after the southern port of Umm Qasr was secured by coalition forces. An additional enemy critical weakness is the lack of local support for a political transition to an Islamic-based government. The overwhelming desire by Iraqis is for democracy. "Polls confirm the appeal of democracy for Iraqis. When Oxford Research International asked Iraqis what their country most needs at this time, 90 percent said democracy."¹⁸ After decades of a repressive dictatorship, the majority of Iraqi people want freedom. "According to the Zogby International Poll, only three percent of Iraqis, including only thirteen percent of Shi'ites, believe the new government should be modeled on Iran's."¹⁹ Religious fanaticism is not widely popular in Iraq today. "The Gallup poll found that 86 percent supported freedom of religion."²⁰ If coalitions stay the course, and that is a big if, they can win this fight. The stockpiles of foodstuffs are a critical vulnerability. If destroyed, the elimination of these stockpiles could cause critical shortages resulting in discontent and unrest by a hungry Iraqi population. A final critical vulnerability is the enemy's ability to inhibit long-term reconstruction projects, preventing Iraqi quality of life improvements.

There is a renewed desire by Western opponents of the Iraqi War to patch up old divisions. France, a vocal opponent, has indicated a willingness to move on and support international efforts to rebuilding Iraq. "Now France and the US want to put their differences behind them"²¹ Concerted international support would increase the likelihood of a successful nation building effort.

¹⁸ Ben Rowswell and Bathsheba Crocker, Anti-Americanism in Iraq: An Obstacle to Democracy?, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, January 16, 2004, 3.

¹⁹ Ibid, 5.

²⁰ Ibid, 5.

²¹ Jannat Jalil, "Bush To Renew Ties On France Trip", BBC News, March 25, 2004.

CENTERS OF GRAVITY

“Unlike traditional adversaries, terrorist networks have no single center of gravity whose destruction would entail the defeat of the entire organization.”²² Insurgents, like terrorists, are also unlike traditional adversaries. However, the enemy does have a center of gravity. It is their extreme, sometimes fanatical, ideology. One difficulty is that there are a number of different insurgency groups, each with their own ideology. However, none of these enemy groups are advocating a transition to a democracy, a desire of 90 percent of the Iraqi population according to polls. The enemy’s center of gravity is their extreme ideology.

The friendly center of gravity is the popular will of each coalition partner. The recent elections in Spain, following the terrorist attacks on their train system, provided a graphic example of what can happen when the popular will declines. Not only did the government fall, but Spanish troops were quickly withdrawn. Our popular will is our center of gravity.

RECOMMENDED ACTION ITEMS

“In practical terms, it falls to the lot of the Army to take on the additional planning, organizing, training, and equipping for the posthostility security mission ... This is entirely unfair. The Army and the Marines should not be tasked with the permanent nation-building responsibility.”²³ Looking at the entire post major conflict phase using critical factors analysis, a number of efforts can improve the ability of the U.S. to support post combat operations. Although it may be too late to implement for Iraq, this list of action items will enhance U.S. capabilities for conducting future post major combat operations.

²² U.S. Department of Homeland Security National Strategy For Homeland Security, Washington DC, July 2002, 10.

ITEM 1: Develop a Goldwater/Nichols-like act for post combat operations. “The Clinton administration worked out a detailed ‘who does what’ kind of [post-conflict operations] blueprint. But that didn’t transcend administrations because it was just a presidential directive.”²⁴ This should not be a presidential directive but law that transcends presidential administrations. “We have to stop making nation-building a political football, recognize that it’s a national competency we need to foster....”²⁵ This will set the framework to help avoid the initial missteps following major combat operations.

ITEM 2: Establish a permanent Office of Post Conflict Operations under the White House with the core mission of post combat. “Nation-building has been a controversial mission (with) institutional resistance in departments of State and Defense, neither of which regard nation-building among their core missions”²⁶ This office should be permanently staffed to provide continuity and expertise. A Coordinator for Iraq has already been recommended.²⁷ What is needed is a permanent coordinator for all future post conflict operations with that as their core mission. As this office matures, it may grow into an agency or department, absorbing existing organizations that complement its core mission. A major reorganization comparable to that of the Department of Homeland Security is needed.

ITEM 3: Develop a major strategy for post combat operations. It should articulate the strategic vision, mission, and requirements for providing post-combat support. This document will serve the U.S. government to set the direction for addressing this issue, provide a framework for working with international organizations to solicit their cooperation,

²³ Walter J. Boyne, *Operation Iraqi Freedom, What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why*, New York, Tom Doherty Associates, 2003, 182.

²⁴ .Wen Stephenson, “Truth, War, and Consequences: What’s at stake? Nation-Building 101”, *Frontline*, October 9, 2003, 9.

²⁵ Ibid, 9.

²⁶ James Dobbins and others, xxviii.

and educate the American public to foster their support, our center of gravity, in backing this costly and time consuming effort.

ITEM 4: Establish a Post-Conflict Operations Development Account. It would provide the bridge money between current emergency funds and long-term development funds for those activities that are not presently covered in existing accounts. This will provide permanent funds necessary to support post combat operations through a mechanism that currently does not exist.²⁸

ITEM 5: Establish a permanent security support organization under the Office of Post-Conflict Operations to support efforts to establish a secure and stable environment. This should be a civilian organization consisting of forces with high-end fighting capability. It will allow a transition from security provided by combat troops to this civilian organization so that combat troops can redeploy earlier. Historically, "... political leaders in Washington conceded that only US military forces were up to the task of overseeing and implementing this final aspect of war."²⁹ One reason the Army currently provides this support is because they are the only ones that can. Creating another organization "that can" will allow armed forces combat troops to redeploy earlier.

ITEM 6: Establish an international civilian police and civil service force under the Office of Post-Conflict Operations. A police force would be specifically trained and equipped as a constabulary force for nation-building operations to ensure a secure environment. Police will be recruited with the objective of foreign deployments for police operations. An international civil service corps should also be recruited to support political

²⁷ Guiding Principles for U.S. Posts-Conflict Policy in Iraq, Council on Foreign Relations and the James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Washington DC, 2002.

²⁸ Play to Win, 18.

efforts. In addition to civil administration skills, recruitment would include international lawyers and judges to fill any post-conflict vacuum in the justice sector.

ITEM 7: “Create a robust civilian rapid response capacity modeled on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)...”³⁰ This would augment the efforts of USAID. “[USAID] programs are neither consistent nor coordinated in a sensibly sequenced way, at least in part because of very different funding mechanisms.”³¹ Adding this capacity to USAID current programs will provide a focus, funding source, and additional capabilities to support nation-building tasks.

ITEM 8: “The administration, working with Congress, should establish a Training Center for Post-Conflict Reconstruction Operations.”³² Improvements in warfighting have come, to a large degree, from the scholarly studies and academic investments made to military personnel in service war colleges. Although U.S warfighting capacity continues to increase, there is “no comparable increase in the capacity of U.S. armed forces or of U.S. civilian agencies to conduct postcombat stabilization and reconstruction projects.”³³ This training center would go a long way to provide continuity and improve techniques to enhance post major combat capabilities.

CONCLUSIONS

Critical factors analysis is an analytical tool that transcends warfighting. The action items in this report use Operation Iraqi Freedom as a template to develop a recommended course of action for post conflict operations. They will improve our chances to enhance the

²⁹ Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance”, Parameters, Carlisle PA, Autumn 2003, Volume 33, Issue 3, 85.

³⁰ Play to Win, 9.

³¹ Ibid, 13.

³² Ibid, 16.

efforts relating to security stabilization, humanitarian assistance, political transition, and reconstruction assistance. These efforts will attack the enemy center of gravity by improving living conditions without resorting to governance by extremists. The course of action provides a concrete framework, strategy, and organizational structure to educate and focus the American public on steps taken to address a problem that has become the inescapable responsibility of the world's only superpower. "Democratic nation-building is possible given a sufficient input of resources and a long-term commitment."³⁴

"We of today shall be judged in the future by the manner in which we meet the unprecedented responsibilities that rest upon us – not alone in winning the war but also in making certain that the opportunity for future peace and security shall last."

Secretary of State Cordell Hull
Remarks to joint session of Congress, November 18, 1943

³³ James Dobbins and others, 220.

³⁴ Ibid. 194.

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